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Political status in the contemporary Pacific Islands takes several forms:
Guam is officially an "organized unincorporated territory" seeking to
become a "commonwealth" of the United States; American Samoa is a "us
unorganized unincorporated territory"; the Northern Mariana Islands are
a us commonwealth that, by many people's reckoning, is still part of the
us Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; Tonga is an independent king-
dom; Tokelau is New Zealand territory; the Cook Islands are a self-gov-
erning state in free association with New Zealand; Wallis and Futuna are
an overseas territory of France; Kiribati is an independent republic; and
soon.
The variety of constitutional arrangements that define political status in
the Pacific Islands may be reduced, in essence, to two main forms: those
that permit sovereignty and those that do not. Further, there are two prin-
cipal forms of nonsovereignty: effective incorporation by a metropolitan
state and semi-autonomy. Although countries in the last category, the
"freely associated" states, have sometimes been said to possess sover-
eignty, they do not. The question is why some states in the Pacific Islands
have been fully decolonized and permitted the prerogatives of sovereignty,
while others have remained in various positions of constitutional depen-
dence on metropolitan powers.
A full explanation must encompass the particularities of historical evo-
lution in different parts of the Pacific Islands. However, an important rea-
son is that different Pacific territories have been of different strategic value
to external states; further, external states have differed in their capacity to
protect their strategic interests by means of direct, constitutional links.
Generally, the greater the strategic value of an island territory, the less
likely that territory has been to proceed to sovereign status. The map of
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Pacific Islands sovereignty has been drawn largely according to the strate-
gic needs of external states. But Papua New Guinea, strategically impor-
tant to Australia yet fully independent, is an obvious exception. Even so,
the strategic needs of external states still playa large role in determining
the development of both sovereign and nonsovereign entities in the
Pacific.
------It-is-first-neeessary-t0-clistinguish-between-these-Paei-fi€-Is1an4s-flel-i-ti~s,---­
with sovereignty and those without. I employ the term sovereignty in the
sense suggested by Alan James, as meaning constitutional independence, a
supremacy deriving from an absence of constitutional ties to another
state. The focus of this definition is on the purely constitutional situation,
leaving aside the question of political independence; it is an attribute that
a state may be said either to have or to not have. By this definition, there
can be no degrees of sovereignty (James I986, 24-25). Chapter I of the
Tuvalu constitution declares, "Tuvalu shall be a sovereign democratic
state," and part I of the constitution of Western Samoa says that "the Inde-
pendent State of Western Samoa ... shall be free and sovereign" (Levine
I983, 9-IO). These statements proclaim the sovereignty of those states, the
constitutional position that has obtained since the British and New
Zealand flags were lowered in those colonial territories. They are claims
to an independent international legal capacity.
DEPENDENT TERRITORIES AND PARTS
OF OTHER SOVEREIGN STATES
Clearly, the French overseas territories in the Pacific-New Caledonia,
French Polynesia, and Wallis and Futuna-do not enjoy sovereignty,
which rests instead with France. Nor is change likely soon. In New Cale-
donia the agreement of August I988 between independence and loyalist
forces-the Front de Liberation Nationale Kanake et Socialiste (FLNKS)
and the Rasse'mblement Pour la Caledonie dans la Republique (RPCR)-
provides for a breathing space of ten years until the next referendum on
the future political status of the territory; the outcome of that referendum
is uncertain. In French Polynesia the idea of an independent Maohi state
has not captured the imagination even of a majority of the Polynesians,
many of whom believe that their livelihoods would disappear without
massive subsidization of the economy from Paris. And in Wallis and
Futuna the people (who number I2,500) have so far shown no inclination
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to break their constitutional connection with France, which underwrites a
higher standard of living than would be possible as an independent state.
Hawai'i is a state of the United States, American Samoa an unincor-
porated territory, and the Northern Marianas a commonwealth. Guam,
still a territory, is moving toward commonwealth status. Midway, Wake,
Johnston Atoll, Howland Island, and Baker Island, together with the
---:A:merican-tin-e-Islands-K-irrgm-a-n-Reef;-P~lmyraKroll, ancqarviSIslano-----
-are all administered by agencies of the us government. In a variety of
ways, all of these islands are bits and pieces of America in the Pacific, con-
stitutionally tied to the United States, just as Easter Island, administered
as part of Valparaiso Province, is tied to Chile, Pitcairn Islands to Britain,
Tokelau to New Zealand, and Norfolk Island to Australia. None of these
territories enjoys sovereignty; all, in one way or another, are effectively
incorporated in a metropolitan state.
FREELY ASSOCIATED STATES
Sovereignty is also precluded by the political status of free association,
even though that allows for a large measure of self-government. Consider
the case of New Zealand and its freely associated states, the Cook Islands
and Niue. The crucial section of the Cook Islands Constitution Act of
1964, a piece of New Zealand legislation, provides that "nothing in this
Act or in the Constitution shall affect the responsibilities of Her Majesty
the Queen in right of New Zealand for the external affairs and defence of
the Cook Islands, those responsibilities to be discharged after consultation
by the Prime Minister of New Zealand with the Premier of the Cook
Islands" (Aikman 1982,87).
A similar constitutional relationship exists between Niue and New
Zealand, and was approved by Niue voters in a United Nations-observed
referendum on 3 September 1974 (Clark 1980, 59). New Zealand has inter-
preted free association as meaning something short of sovereign indepen-
dence but far less restrictive than territorial status, pointing out in 1979
that "the exercise by the New Zealand Government of any responsibilities
in foreign affairs or defence must be preceded by full consultation with the
Cook Islands. These responsibilities are more in the nature of obligations
on New Zealand's part rather than rights of supervision or control" (Clark
1988, 20). The Cook Islands was not admitted to the benefits of the Lome
II Convention, governing trade between the European Community and
H
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the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States, when it sought mem-
bership in 1979. The reason given by the European Community was that
the Cook Islands did not enjoy the status of an independent state "and is
not acknowledged by the United Nations as an independent state or
acceptable as a Member of the United Nations" (Aikman 1982, 93). Yet as
a full member-one of the founding members-of the South Pacific
-----'Fc--o=-r-u-m-,-w-'hlcliaOmits sell-governmg as well as sovereign state$-;-rh-e-eo-ok----
Islands is a party to regional agreements such as the 1979 Convention on
the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency and SPARTECA, the South Pacific
Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement of 1980, and has
signed a maritime-boundary-delimitation treaty with the United States. In
its own right, it has signed and ratified the South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone Treaty of 1985. Lacking sovereignty, which is the passport to unchal-
lengeable participation in the international system, the Cook Islands must
depend for its capacity to enter international legal arrangements on the
willingness of other parties to interact with it, and must consult New
Zealand about such arrangements beforehand.
What is striking about the free association which the Cooks and Niue
have with New Zealand is that they may terminate the relationship unilat-
erally by simply amending their own constitutions (Clark 1988,17; Quen-
tin-Baxter 1982, II9). They are at liberty to leave. Free association for
them can be seen as genuinely free, a step on the way to sovereign inde-
pendenc:e if that is what the Cook Islanders and the Niueans should ever
want.
Free association for the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), however, specifically prevents a full
and final decolonization by binding those states to the former administer-
ing authority in perpetuity. Separate mutual security pacts, which accom-
pany the Compact of Free Association between the United States and each
of these states, place an obligation on the United States to defend the
Marshalls and the Federated States forever, and permit it to foreclose
access to the military forces of third countries forever (USH-CFA 1985).
Section 443 of the compact permits a freely associated state to withdraw
from free association if by a plebiscite it gains a majority vote in favor of
termination. No doubt James D. Berg, the director of the Office of Freely
Associated State Affairs, had this section in mind when he claimed early in
1988 that there are "provisions for each of the states unilaterally to termi-
nate its relationship with the United States in favor of full independence"
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(Berg 1988,2). What he failed to point out was that the subsidiary agree-
ments regarding sections 321 and 323 of the compact, the sections that deal
with us military facilities and operating rights in the Marshalls and the
Federated States, create a right of permanent strategic denial in the area by
the United States armed forces. Such a right can hardly be reconciled with
"full independence" or with the "sovereign" status that Berg said is the
_.__gnaLoLfLe_e_assnciation._The-.effecLoLthe-subsidiar-y-agreements-is-that-the
Marshalls and the Federated States may withdraw from the benefits but
not from the costs and obligations created by their political settlement
with the United States.
It has been argued that the relationship with the United States created
by the compact "does not involve any continuing constitutional link"
because "everything done within an associated State" is the product of
voluntary agreement (Quentin-Baxter 1982, 120). The crucial word here,
however, is "within." The Marshall Islands cannot terminate the applica-
tion of strategic denial by a constitutional amendment. In this sense I
assert the existence of a constitutional link between the United States and
Micronesia.
In the case of the draft compact with Belau, still not in effect, section
453(a) provides that strategic denial "remains in effect for a period of fifty
years and thereafter until terminated or otherwise amended by mutual
consent." In other words, the United States possesses a veto over any
change to its permanent monopoly over military access to Belau. Far from
being "not unlike the relationship of the Cook Islands and Niue with New
Zealand," as Berg claimed (1988, 2) free association in Micronesia is quite
unlike it on the vital issue of bringing security obligations to an end.
The United Nations approved the Cook Islands' free association with
New Zealand in 1965 and the Niue arrangement in 1974. A form of UN
approval has also been obtained for free association in Micronesia, but
the precise status of the Micronesian states in international law is still far
from clear. The question is: what has happened to the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands? Does it now exist only in the form of Belau, which has
not yet reached agreement with its former administering authority over
the terms of free association? Or does the Trust Territory also encompass
the Northern Marianas, the FSM, and the Marshalls, despite their having
assumed new political statuses?
The problem goes back to the question of how a strategic trusteeship is
terminated. Of the eleven trusteeship territories established under UN
"""";1'1'" ee we
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supervision after World War II, only one, the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, was "strategic." The agreements covering the other ten were ter-
minated by an approving vote of the UN General Assembly. But article 83
of the UN Charter clearly provides that the Security Council alone shall
have the authority to terminate a trusteeship over a strategic area: "All
functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the
-----aflflf0va-1-0f-~h~-t~Fms-0f-~h~tHl_st~~ship-agf~~m~nts-and-Qi-their-alter-ation _
or amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council."
Compare this provision of the UN Charter with the words of President
Reagan in a proclamation of 3 November 1986: "the Trusteeship Agree-
ment for the Pacific Islands is no longer in effect as of October 21, 1986,
with respect to the Republic of the Marshall Islands, as of November 3,
1986, with respect to the Federated States of Micronesia, and as of
November 3, 1986, with respect to the Northern Mariana Islands" (USFR
1986). President Reagan also described the Marshalls and the FSM as "sov-
ereign, self-governing nations in free association with the United States"
(UNTC 1987b). Without Security Council approval, and in a purely unilat-
eral act, the United States government determined that the trusteeship
agreement was no longer in effect for three of the four Micronesian entit-
ies. Quite apart from the issue of Security Council approval, the claim by
an administering authority that the trusteeship is at an end in three parts
of a territory while it remains in force in a fourth is unique and unprece-
dented in the history of decolonizing trusteeships: it is as if, in 1962, New
Zealand had declared Savai'i decolonized but not Upolu, or Australia in
1975 had said that it considered all of New Guinea to be no longer under
the trusteeship except for New Britain or the north Solomons. And to say
that the Marshalls and the Federated States are "sovereign ... nations" is
to stretch beyond usefulness the meaning of the word sovereign. They are
self-governing states, certainly, but they lack sovereignty.
To confuse matters further, the United States changed its position
within a few months. In an exchange between Soviet and American repre-
sentatives to the UN Trusteeship Council in May 1987, the us representa-
tive said she believed "the Trusteeship Agreement remains in force" and
undertook that "all actions the United States has taken, is taking and will
take are and will continue to be consistent and in accord with the [UN]
Charter and the Trusteeship Agreement" (UNTC 1987a, 41,46). For years
the Reagan administration promised that it would seek Security Council
approval for terminating the trusteeship in Micronesia. But since 1986 it
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has been circumventing the Security Council by relying on a Trusteeship
Council resolution as the international legal basis for its actions. In May
1986, at the fifty-third session of the Trusteeship Council, the United
States succeeded in gaining the support of France and the United King-
dom, against the negative vote of the Soviet Union, for a resolution that
put what might be called a second-class stamp of UN approval on the new
---politiGal-status-ef-free-assee-iatien-in-Mier0nesia-;-'Fhe-T-rusteeship-eouncil-------
noted that the Micronesian peoples had "freely exercised their right to
self-determination in plebiscites observed by visiting missions of the
Trusteeship Council" and had chosen either free association or, in the case
of the Northern Mariana Islands, commonwealth status. It requested that
the United States "agree on a date not later than 30 September 1986 for the
full entry into force of the Compact of Free Association and the Common-
wealth Covenant" (UNTC 1986, 14).
As it happened, the timetable was not quite met, and because of contin-
uing conflict over Belau's nuclear-free constitution, the Compact of Free
Association was not enacted for that territory. But the essence of the
American victory remained: the Trusteeship Council, responsible for
overseeing the actions of the administering authority, endorsed American
plans for the future of Micronesia. The American Embassy in Canberra,
for example, was able to reassure Australians in November 1987 that the
United States and three of the four Micronesian territories had "proceeded
to implement the new arrangements, as requested by the United Nations
Trusteeship Council in May 1986" (US Embassy 1987, 2, my emphasis).
What the embassy neglected to say was that the Trusteeship Council reso-
lution also included the statement that it was "conscious of the responsi-
bility of the Security Council in respect of strategic areas as set out in Arti-
cle 83, paragraph 1, of the [UN] Charter" (UNTC 1986, 14-15). That
responsibility is to approve any changes in trusteeship arrangements,
including their termination. Thus the Trusteeship Council itself accepts
that the Security Council should have the final say over trusteeship in
Micronesia.
The United States fears a Soviet veto of its termination of the Microne-
sian trusteeship. Because the Security Council consists of five permanent
and eleven rotating members, a successful resolution requires nine affirm-
ative votes and no veto. Gaining a majority in favor of termination would
not be difficult, but the vote of the Soviet Union is crucial, and there has
been long debate within the us Executive Branch about how to avoid
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defeat because of it. The president's personal representative for Microne-
sian status negotiations, Fred M. Zeder II, said in I986 that America's goal
in the Security Council is to "prevent any nation, or bloc of nations, from
disrupting the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement and denying the
peoples of the Trust Territory their freely chosen political status desires"
(uscs I986, 83). At that time Zeder also foreshadowed an unorthodox
--------..s=olmion torfte-pruhlem-;-ahh-ough-he-conceded-that-sooner-or-Iater-the----
matter would have to go to the Security Council. There is, he said,
no precise procedure set forth in the Trusteeship Agreement, nor is there any
precedent, for termination of a strategic trust. Of the eleven trusteeships
created after World War II this is the only one with "strategic" implications.
Therefore we will assume the prerogative of adopting a procedure which is
consistent with accepted international practice and best suited to the accom-
plishment of our objectives. (ibid)
Whatever Zeder meant by this, the United States has indeed decolonized
its trusteeship territory in a way "best suited to the accomplishment of [its]
objectives." For the moment Washington appears to have settled for say-
ing one thing and doing another: proclaiming American adherence to the
UN Charter and acceptance that the trusteeship agreement remains in
force, while treating the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia
as territories whose international legal status has irrevocably changed.
The delay in settling the political status of Belau, which all agree is still
under the trusteeship, has enabled the us government to avoid a final
choice between terminating the entire trust unilaterally and risking a
rebuff in the Security Council.
The precise legal status of the Micronesian states is of more than merely
academic interest. It affects the legal right of certain Marshallese to sue the
us government and, in the long run, the international acceptability of
these new island countries. At the Apia meeting of the South Pacific
Forum in I987 the prime ministers of Papua New Guinea, the Solomon
Islands, and Vanuatu at first wanted to confine the Marshalls and the
Federated States to observer status rather than admit them to full member-
ship before the UN had properly approved the termination of the trustee-
ship (Washington Pacific Report, I June I987). Before I987 the Forum had
admitted to membership only those states that were incontestably decolo-
nized in one way or another. Although the hesitations of the Melanesian
bloc at Apia subsided, they may foreshadow continuing doubts as to the
"f' .Ei
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legal capacity of the Micronesian states to participate in international
affairs.
Such doubts are of concern to Micronesian leaders. As President John
Haglelgam of the Federated States said during his official visit to Australia
in October 1988, "Palau's problem has a direct influence over the FSM and
RMI because there are some members of the United Nations who say the
trusteeshiQ was not really 12ro12erly terminated. If Palau,~~PQthetkally _
speaking, had been in the same relationship with the us as the Marshalls
and FSM, we could together approach the UN and demand a complete ter-
mination" (Sydney Morning Herald, 29 Oct 1988).
SOVEREIGN STATES
The South Pacific island states whose sovereignty is not in question are the
rest: Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, Western
Samoa, Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Nauru. In recent years the leaders of
these states have not hesitated to demonstrate their sovereign capacity to
deal with other states.
In 1985 the Republic of Kiribati signed a fisheries access agreement that
allowed a Soviet fishing company to operate sixteen purse seiners and
longliners in Kiribati waters for a year in return for A$2.4 million (US$r.5
million) in access fees. It was not renewed in 1986. The agreement was
greeted with dismay in the United States and Australia, where politicians
claimed that the I-Kiribati would not be experienced or canny enough to
prevent the Russians from using their fishing vessels as bridgeheads in
extending Soviet influence into the central Pacific. Few of the foreign crit-
ics remembered that, under article 3 of its Treaty of Friendship with the
United States, Kiribati was already obliged to deny shore-based facilities
in the Line and Phoenix groups to other powers, and that in any case it
had no intention of permitting the Soviets a shore base in the Gilberts.
Subsequent events showed President Ieremia Tabai to have been correct in
insisting that the agreement was commercial in character. Why else would
the Russians have halved their fishing fees offer in 1986? The benefits that
flowed to Kiribati are clear: fishing fees that represented about a quarter
of the government's annual budget; experience in dealing with an unfamil-
iar foreign country; and additional political leverage in the multilateral
negotiations that led to the fisheries access treaty between the United
States and member countries of the Forum Fisheries Agency (Neemia
1986).
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Vanuatu signed a one-year fisheries agreement with the Soviet Union in
January 1987, permitting eight Soviet fishing vessels to fish in Vanuatu's
exclusive economic zone, but excluding them from its territorial waters.
Although Soviet vessels could refuel at designated ports, they were not
permitted on-shore facilities. The agreement was not renewed in 1988.
Like Nauru, Vanuatu has established diplomatic relations with the Soviet
-----Union,_huLiLis-unique_amQng_S_o_uth Pacific states in belonging,_t=o~th=e=----- _
Non-Aligned Movement (Hegarty 1988 , 5).
As E. P. Wolfers has pointed out, Papua New Guinea is now making
use of its sovereign independence to move closer to ASEAN, and partici-
pates in some ASEAN committees: "Papua New Guinea political leaders
and public servants have ... begun to test the orientation towards the
South Pacific embodied in previous policies. They are coming to terms, in
thought and action, with their interests in South-East Asia" (Wolfers 1988,
28). An old colonial idea from German times-that Papua New Guinea is
as much a Southeast Asian as a Pacific country-is finding new expression
after thirteen years of political independence. At the same time Papua
New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu are consolidating the
Melanesian Spearhead group, a subregional bloc of Melanesian states,
which they believe will further their common interests. The three states
signed a set of Agreed Principles of Cooperation in March 1988. Both of
these developments are examples of what Wolfers called "the practical
realisation of formal independence" in the Pacific Islands (ibid, 3).
An alternative interpretation of recent events in the Pacific is that they
demonstrate the vulnerability of sovereign microstates to the blandish-
ments of unwelcome forces in the region. By this view, the actions of states
such as Kiribati and Vanuatu, while they may be a legitimate exercise of
sovereignty, are also "a source of strategic threat to Western security inter-
ests" (Herr 1988, 189) and encourage superpower rivalry. Microstate sov-
ereignty is seen as a problem for the West rather than an opportunity for
the island states.
EXTERNAL STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS
AND PACIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
The interests of the United States in the South Pacific have been essentially
strategic ever since American forces fought their way west from the
Gilbert Islands to Belau and Okinawa in the Second World War. Five of
America's seven defense agreements are in the Asia-Pacific region: the
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bilateral treaties with Japan, Korea, and the Philippines; the Manila Pact
which includes Thailand; and the ANZUS Treaty, now suspended between
the United States and New Zealand but still maintained as a bilateral
defense alliance with Australia. American ships, aircraft, and forces in
Hawai'i and Guam directly serve those defense agreements, and are part
of a larger commitment of forces to the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the
__~P~h=il=i.I2J2ines.The us Air Force is_lKes_ently---.llpgrading_facilities-at-'Iinian-in---------
the Northern Marianas.
Historically, different parts of the us Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands fitted into this strategic scheme as sites for exploding nuclear
bombs, testing ICBMS, and training Chinese anticommunist forces. Kwaja-
lein Atoll in the Marshall Islands remains a missile-testing center today
and is being used for the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative.
Under the proposed fifty-year compact with Belau, the us armed forces
will have the option of full use of Airai Airport, Ngeaur (Angaur) Airport,
Malakal Harbor, and a large area of the main island of Babeldaob for mil-
itary training in tropical conditions. The strategic importance of Ameri-
can Micronesia in a war with the Soviet Union has been explained by John
C. Dorrance, a State Department specialist in Pacific affairs:
Micronesia and Guam have strategic value in still another sense. In peacetime
they lie to the south of major sea and air lanes across the North Pacific. How-
ever, in any Pacific war scenario involving the Soviets, U.S. lines of communi-
cation would shift to the south and run through or near Micronesia; ships and
aircraft would attempt to move beyond the range of Soviet attack aircraft
operating out of bases in the Kuril Islands and on the Soviet Asian mainland.
For this reason, but also because of the threat that would be posed to Hawaii
and to areas south of the equator, a primary U.S. objective in the political sta-
tus negotiations with the Micronesian governments has been an arrangement
that assures no adversary of the United States or of its allies would have access
to these islands for military purposes. (Dorrance 1986, 8)
For reasons of strategy the us government never seriously offered
Micronesians the option of sovereign independence followed by postinde-
pendence aid. The realistic alternative for the Micronesians was to bar-
gain for what they could get by selling the only things they had to sell-
their strategic and military value to the United States and, in the process,
their sovereignty. The Compacts of Free Association with the Marshalls,
the Federated States, and Belau enshrine those bargains.
France's interests in the Pacific Islands are likewise primarily strategic,
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because they are intimately linked to the modernization of French nuclear
forces. The Pacific territories, the French believe, also offer a future
option on possible economic returns that might flow from exploitation of
seabed minerals in the vast exclusive economic zones that surround
French Pacific possessions. By virtue of its presence in French Polynesia
and New Caledonja, France can maintain a navy with commands that
.-----span...the_glohe_andinclude the Pacific as well as the Atlantic and Indian
oceans and the Mediterranean. In the French view, the Pacific presence
helps to confer international prestige on the French Republic. But it is the
nuclear test center at Moruroa, Fangataufa, and Hao atolls, under the
protection of the commander of French Pacific forces based in Papeete,
that attracts massive metropolitan subsidies for French Polynesia and con-
tributes to the desire by successive French governments to prevent or delay
the decolonization of New Caledonia. The emergence of a sovereign state
of Kanaky would, at the very least, complicate the domestic politics of
nuclear testing in French Polynesia.
Nuclear modernization is at the heart of French military planning and
involves a notable increase in the number and capability of French nuclear
weapons. Currently, for example, France's six nuclear-powered ballistic-
missile submarines carry a total of 256 nuclear warheads; by I992, that
number will grow to 496. And in I994 the first of a new (SNLE-NG) class of
nuclear submarines will enter service, taking the total number of subma-
rine warheads to 592. The nuclear submarine command, La Force Ocean-
ique Strategique, holds special prestige within the French Navy. France
intends to maintain its aircraft-carrier capability, and a nuclear-powered
Charles-de-Gaulle-class carrier is on order. It will carry about forty air-
craft, which will be armed with nuclear air-to-surface missiles. The two
French aircraft carriers in service are also nuclear-capable (Handler and
Arkin I988, 28-29).
Regular naval and air patrols by the French armed forces already cover
a greater area of the globe than those of any other nation except the super-
powers. By the mid-I990S, when many of its new nuclear weapons will
have been deployed, France will undoubtedly rank as the third military
power in the world after the United States and the Soviet Union. Under
these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that France should wish to
maintain sovereignty over the Pacific territory where nuclear tests are con-
ducted.
If lack of sovereignty in Micronesia and French Polynesia can be
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ascribed to the strategic needs of the Americans and the French, how is the
complete decolonization, at least in formal terms, of the former Pacific
territories of the United Kingdom and Australia to be interpreted? The
assumption behind this question is that the colonizing powers in the
Pacific Islands had a choice about whether or not to fully decolonize their
territories. Pacific Islands nationalism was weak; by African standards, it
hardly existed. Except for Papua New Guinea, all the territories were
small, with populations under 650,000.
British withdrawal from the Pacific Islands has a straightforward expla-
nation. Britain decided in the 1960s, for economic reasons, not to main-
tain a colonial and defense presence east of Suez except for a lingering
responsibility under the Five Pt>wer Defence Agreement and in connection
with the Crown Colony of Hong Kong (Millar 1978,245). The sovereign
independence of Fiji (1970), Tonga (1970), Solomon Islands (1978),
Tuvalu (1978), Kiribati (1979), and Vanuatu (1980) followed as a natural
consequence. Only one colony, Pitcairn Islands, is left. Although the
United Kingdom remains a member of the South Pacific Commission and
an important donor of aid to the Pacific (US$20.2 million in 1985; ADFA
1987,69), it can hardly be said to have a strategic stake in the Pacific. The
occasional visit by the Royal Navy is a residue of past interests rather than
an indicator of present claims.
The case of Australia is far more significant. In a 1987 submission to a
parliamentary inquiry into Australia's relations with the South Pacific, the
Department of Foreign Affairs in Canberra officially identified "Austra-
lia's interests in the South Pacific [as] primarily security related and politi-
cal in nature." Within the South Pacific the department saw Australia's
security interests as being strongest in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon
Islands, and New Caledonia, with Vanuatu and Fiji "also of substantial
security interest." Australia needed to protect "the sea and air lines of com-
munication" and facilitate "the deployment of United States defence force
units into the region through the maintenance of freedom of passage
through the high seas and access to regional ports for us and other West-
ern naval vessels." Australia also needed to limit the presence in the region
of "governments with strategic interests, or value systems, which conflict
with our own" and to promote among South Pacific states "a consensus on
security related matters aligned with the security interests of Australia and
its allies" (ADFA 1987,7). Although Australia seeks to defend its investment
in South Pacific banking, shipping, tourism, and retailing, and while it
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professes humanitarian concern for the Islanders, the principal preoccupa-
tion of the Australian government is strategic. The Department of Defence
in Canberra, acknowledging that the "South Pacific forms part of Austra-
lia's region of primary strategic interest," has explained clearly why Aus-
tralia gives aid:
Australian development assistance policies support strategic and defence pol-
icy objectives in the region. . . . Where aspirations can be assisted and eco-
nomic development supported, the ensuing political stability is an important
strategic asset. Such considerations are of particular relevance in the South
Pacific where strategic considerations are heavily influenced by the economic
security of the island countries. (ADD 1987, 2,7)
Australia's aid agency has reiterated the point that the Australian "aid
relationship with the countries of the South Pacific . . . is inseparable
from Australia's foreign policy priorities and reflects them" (ADAB
I987,2).
If the strategic requirements of external states are so closely connected
to nonsovereignty in the South Pacific, how is it that Australia granted full
independence to Papua New Guinea and respects the sovereignty of
another eight island states, three of which (Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Nauru)
are among the smallest sovereign nations in the world? The argument so
far would appear to require that Papua New Guinea at least have some
form of free association with its former colonial authority. And what is
the rationale of New Zealand, which granted full independence to West-
ern Samoa but maintains free association with the Cook Islands and Niue?
Australia was not in a position to determine what form decolonization
would take in territories other than its own (Nauru and Papua New
Guinea). The coming of sovereign independence to Western Samoa, Fiji,
Tonga, Tuvalu, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and Vanuatu lay outside its
control. Australia has sought to exert influence after independence by
becoming the largest aid donor to the South Pacific. It has always been the
largest source of aid to Papua New Guinea, and as an aid donor to the rest
of the South Pacific it overtook New Zealand in I978 and the United King-
dom in I982. All the independent states of the South Pacific receive more
aid from Australia than from any other source, with the single exception
of Kiribati. And Australian aid to the Cook Islands and Niue comes sec-
ond only to development assistance from New Zealand (ADAB I987, 4).
The Australians are no less keen than the Americans and the French to
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keep the island states pro-Western, but for historical reasons they lack the
option of direct, formal intervention and must rely instead on persuasion
backed by the powerful argument of aid. As the Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs put it, "Australia seeks to promote its political! security
interests through persuasion-through political and diplomatic exchanges
in association with our aid, trade, defence co-operation and other pro-
grams designed to promote economic development as well as confidence
in Australia as a concerned, reliable partner" (ADFA 1987, I).
Australia has diplomatic relations with all independent South Pacific
states and resident representation in all except tiny Tuvalu. Its aid sustains
such major regional institutions as the Forum Secretariat (formerly the
South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation), the Committee for the
Coordination of Off-Shore Prospecting in the South Pacific, and the
Forum Fisheries Agency. No other aid donor gives as much to regional
organizations (ADAB 1987,92).
Decolonization of the Australian territories occurred at a time when the
winds of change in favor of complete independence blew more strongly
than they do now. An additional complication for Australia was that
Nauru and New Guinea were trusteeship territories under United Nations
supervision. The United Nations was pressing Australia for action. No
one could argue that an independent Nauru, all twenty-one square kilo-
meters of it, represented a strategic loss to Australia, and because of its
phosphate, Nauru has never required aid. Recent attempts by the Nauru
government to claim compensation from Australia for the worked-out
phosphate lands have not met with success. As far as Papua New Guinea
was concerned, the question in the minds of decision-makers in Canberra
by 1970 was not whether the territory would gain sovereign independence
but when and how. In 1968 Australia still had not ruled out the possibility
of seventh statehood or free association for Papua New Guinea; in 1969
Prime Minister John Gorton made it clear that complete independence
was the goal of the Australian government (Griffin, Nelson, and Firth
1979,142,161).
The difference between Australia and New Zealand as decolonizers lay
in their tolerance toward Pacific Islander immigration. Ideas about asso-
ciating Papua, if not New Guinea, with Australia all foundered on objec-
tions to granting Papuans genuine Australian citizenship or even access to
the Australian mainland. For Australia, any kind of "free association"
with Papua or Papua New Guinea would have entailed free entry of the
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people of those territories, just as the Cook Islanders and Niueans have
been permitted free entry to New Zealand. Most Niueans and a majority
of Cook Islanders have now left their island homes and live in New
Zealand. When Australia was making final decisions about the future
political status of its Melanesian territories, racial discrimination in its
migration policy was only just being dismantled. Not until 1973 did the
Whitlam Labor government fully remove such discrimination. As the
revival of the race and migration debate in 1988 has shown, all Australian
governments face electoral pressure on this issue (Palfreeman 1980, 99).
The idea that Australia is a white country, or ought to be, dies hard.
The political price Australia would have had to pay for safeguarding its
strategic interests in Papua New Guinea in a direct way, as the United
States has done in Micronesia, was too high for any government to con-
template, especially given the size of Papua New Guinea's population in
relation to Australia's. In this respect the liberal instincts of a generation
of Australian decolonizers in the Department of External Territories and
the administration at Konedobu in Port Moresby accorded nicely not only
with United Nations opinion, but also with the race fears of the Austra-
lian populace. Australia could present itself to the world as a decent decol-
onizer while preventing any significant immigration from the Melanesian
territories it had ruled for most of the century. Whereas New Zealand
opted for statutory responsibility for the external affairs and defense of
the Cook Islands and Niue (rarely exercised but available if necessary) and
permitted the people of those states to remain New Zealand citizens, Aus-
tralia granted Papua New Guinea independence and, in theory at least,
deprived about one million Papuans of Australian citizenship as residents
of an Australian territory. To ensure that the new state did not fall apart,
it then embarked on a program of massive subsidization-A$4.3 billion
(about US$3.6 billion at current values) between 1975 and 1986 and still
amounting to more than 80 percent of all the aid Papua New Guinea
receives (ADAB 1987, 7).
In purely economic terms, as measured by Western criteria, sovereignty
has come to Pacific Islanders at a price. The standard of living, in cash
terms, is higher in those Pacific islands associated with the UnitedStates
and France. In Micronesia the nature of the deal is plain for all to see,
although the governments of the Federated States and the Marshall
Islands may be spending compact money in ways that will necessitate
another, less favorable, deal in fifteen years' time. The aim of the compact
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-to finance a transition to relative economic independence-is unlikely
to be realized, given the previous experience of Micronesian leaders with
money from Washington and the political claims on them to translate the
compact into immediate consumption (Hezel 1988).
In the French territories the benefits flow according to an unspoken
bargain that is nevertheless underpinned by the same strategic logic: the
security of France is at stake, and the French government should therefore
subsidize the Pacific territories at a level likely to dim the ardor of those
who favor complete independence. Under the peace plan for New Caledo-
nia approved by 80 percent of those voters who participated in the
national referendum of November 1988, development funds will flow to
the Kanak regions of the territory, and the consequence might well be a
weakening of the FLNKS during the decade before the scheduled final deci-
sion on political status. That, at least, will likely be the hope of RPCR sup-
porters in New Caledonia.
THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
Economic prospects in the independent Pacific are less encouraging. Aus-
tralia's aid agency concluded that the standard of living in the majority of
South Pacific states has been declining in recent years, and that, despite
greatly increased aid since 1976, "this aid is not achieving its objective of
self-reliance to the degree that it could-or should" (ADAB 1987, 20). If
economic stagnation were to continue for the next fifteen years, the Solo-
mon Islands would join Kiribati, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa in
the category of least developed countries, and Fiji's standard of living
would decline. That assessment was reached before the Fiji coups of 1987,
which have already damaged the Fijian economy and promise to do so fur-
ther. The agency's identification of Fiji as the one example of a "self-suffi-
ciency" model among South Pacific economies is no longer accurate, leav-
ing the region bereft of any such model. Although the agency held out
hope that, as "Melanesian growth models," the economies of Papua New
Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu might eventually survive with-
out aid, such an outcome depended on what were called "appropriate
policies." For the "subsistence affluence" countries of Western Samoa and
Tonga, and for the "microstates" of Kiribati and Tuvalu, permanent aid
seemed likely (ADAB 1987, 24-25).
On a per capita basis, the South Pacific states are the most aid-depen-
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dent in the world. The material expectations of their people are related
not to the land and its resources, as in precolonial times, but to the cash
standard of living enjoyed by their neighbors in the "strategic value"
economies and to the experiences of emigrants who have had access to the
labor markets of New Zealand, Australia, Hawai'i, and California. The
survival of most South Pacific governments depends on their ability to
deliver goods and services at a rate not too far below that of the late colo-
nial period. Without aid, that delivery would become impossible.
CONCLUSION
All of the sovereign South Pacific states, together with the two freely asso-
ciated states that may unilaterally acquire sovereignty, were formerly Brit-
ish, Australian, or New Zealand territories. The only significant colonies
left in the Pacific are those of France, and the freely associated states
which may not unilaterally acquire sovereignty are tied ,to the United
States. At first glance, the pattern would seem to be explained simply by
different national traditions of decolonization. The British Common-
wealth approach was to favor full independence or to allow for it in the
future, whereas the American and French preference has been to limit or
block it. By this interpretation, the British, the Australians, and the New
Zealanders are good international citizens in an age of decolonization,
and the Americans and the French are either bad or hypocritical.
Such an analysis is simple-minded. A better explanation comes from
considering the strategic interests of the external powers and their capac-
ity to defend those interests in the face of international criticism. By this
view, the United States and France, the first and third military powers in
the world, possess what they regard as vital strategic interests in the
Pacific Islands-not least because they are nuclear weapons states-and
they are powerful enough to ignore international criticism. If necessary,
the Bush administration will probably terminate the strategic trusteeship
in Micronesia without bothering to gain the approval of the United
Nations Security Council as the United Nations Charter requires; and it
will talk, as the Reagan administration did, of the "sovereign" status
enjoyed by the freely associated states. By their determination to continue
nuclear testing in French Polynesia despite more than twenty years of pro-
test, the French have demonstrated that they, too, are strong enough to
ignore international opinion. As the Chirac years, 1986 to 1988, showed,
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there can be no certainty that successive French governments will keep
open the option of independence for New Caledonia.
Britain granted independence in the Pacific Islands because it was a
spent force there. Australia had strategic interests in the region, but could
not determine the course of decolonization except in its own territories; as
a smaller player on the world scene, Australia was in any case more sus-
ceptible to international opinion in favor of independence. For Australia,
independence in most of the South Pacific has been an accomplished fact
that it has had to deal with by informal rather than formal means; the
attractions of a formal link with Papua New Guinea were outweighed by
the fear of Melanesian immigration. New Zealand, an even smaller
player, went to great lengths to ensure that its decolonization of Western
Samoa, the Cook Islands, and Niue met with United Nations approval
and conformed with the requirements of UN General Assembly Resolution
I5I4(XV) of I960 on the granting of independence to colonial countries and
peoples. A greater contrast to the French attitude to that resolution is hard
to imagine.
For economic reasons, the sovereignty of sovereign states has delivered
less complete independence than might have been expected. The islands'
economies are weak; the Islanders' expectations are high. Judging by
recent events, the Islanders' best hope seems to lie in mild flirtations with
non-Western powers, which have the effect of encouraging a rush of West-
ern assistance. The fisheries access agreement between the United States
and members of the Forum Fisheries Agency was reached in a political
atmosphere of this kind; similar motives lie behind new aid initiatives
being undertaken by the Takeshita government in Japan; and Australia's
new minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Gareth Evans, took
the unprecedented step of making his first overseas visit to the South
Pacific rather than Japan, the United States, or Southeast Asia. The "new
instability" has provoked a new concern.
Playing off West against East has its limitations as a path to indepen-
dent development, however. A major aid donor such as Australia is
always in a strong position to exert influence over island states and,
because of its strategic interests, has a powerful motive to do so. The
potential loss of an Australian aid package, for example, was almost cer-
tainly decisive in persuading Fiji to suspend its draconian internal security
decree in November I988. Just as nonsovereign states in the Pacific face
obvious constraints on their independence, so do sovereign states. For
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sovereignty to be translated into a greater measure of genuine political
independence-however such independence might be interpreted by
islands governments-sovereign states would have to drastically reduce
their reliance on aid. As things stand in the South Pacific, that seems
unlikely to happen.
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